Arguments claiming superiority of brain-related criteria for death over traditional cardio-respiratory criteria have frequently appealed to the fact of irreversible loss of function. Whilst (1) . None of these claims have been substantiated. All over the world thousands of brainstem-dead ex-patients have been maintained on ventilators and meticulously observed until asystole (2) . None have ever recovered.
According to David J Cole (3) the case for or against brain-related criteria for death is unaffected by empirical observations concerning the irreversible state of a dead brain. For Cole, the very concept of 'irreversible', as it is employed in medical science, is ambiguous. He argues that there is a disparity between 'medical' conceptions of death ('irreversible loss of function of all or part of the body') and 'lay, religious, and lexicographic definitions'. The former, he claims, 'forms a significant departure from the ordinary concept ofdeath' and has 'peculiar and perhaps unacceptable consequences'. Cole The strong construal of irreversibility Essential to Cole's criticism of medical irreversibility is his appeal to conditions which today are irreversible but one day might be reversible. Fifty years ago end-stage renal failure was irreversibly terminal. Today, with dialysis and transplants, it is not. Cole offers a further argument against a strong construal of 'irreversibility' when he suggests that in some unspecified time T this patient, now dead, might be reassembled and brought back to life. On this argument criteria for treating something as a corpse would have to be abandoned. In another example he suggests that if the world were to change dramatically death might one day become reversible. The problem with these examples is that, although they refer to logical possibilities, they are under-described. Just how significantly would the world have to change? For example, a world without death would seem to be inhabited by gods. The contrast with such a world and the present one is even greater than a contrast between the world of a third world peasant with ox and bell and that of a Western yuppie with Mercedes and car-phone; the world where death has been conquered involves changes which defy implementation.
To provide a sense for his arguments against a strong construal of 'irreversibility' Cole appeals to 'exotic, as yet undeveloped or even contemplated, techniques'. These are the stuff that dreams are made of: transport faster than light, thought transference over large distances and death reversal. They all require uncontemplated techniques. These implausible speculations are finally capped with a claim that 'given the openendedness of medical progress, it is reasonable to suppose that the ability to reverse nearly any condition will be attained at some time in the future'. What does Cole mean by 'reasonable' here? He means that such fantastic predictions are free from contradiction. In any other sense they are unreasonable because they are implausible and certainly not evidentially powerful enough to require any change in policy guidelines for diagnosing death. Is it reasonable to practise medicine in the expectation that some future Dr Frankenstein will re-assemble long-dead corpses and bring them back to life? Of course it is logically possible, but its very implausibility renders it unsatisfactory as a guide for policy.
Appeals to logical possibility mean that certain propositions cannot be ruled out no matter how fantastic. ' The weak construal of irreversibility With this kind of speculative freedom problems can easily be generated. If no one is irreversibly dead then post-mortem organ removal is not only conceptually problematic; it is ethically undesirable as it denies a person possible future use of his or her organs. To avoid these problems Cole offers medical science a weaker version of the irreversibility condition which acknowledges that some states are irreversible now, although in the future they may be reversed. But this, argues Cole, is still unsatisfactory as it introduces problematic relativities. Whilst patient Y is irreversibly dead for Dr X at time T, she is potentially alive to Dr Z at time T1, for Dr Z has access to computer material that will reveal how to apply near miraculous therapy within minutes, thus reversing the state of Dr X's (ex)-patient. This causes problems for Dr X, who would otherwise authorise the harvesting of organs from his dead patient. For the patient could be brought back to life by Dr Z's previously uncontemplated therapy. According to Cole, Dr X has an ethical obligation to continue ventilating the patient beyond death because it is logically possible for some new reversible therapy to be found. Hence Cole concludes that neither the strong nor the weak construals of 'irreversibility' are free from ambiguity. But is this argument, based on the fictions of logical possibility, significantly damaging to a well-grounded diagnosis of death? Moreover, is it supported by appeals to ordinary concepts of death? The ethical problems generated by logical possibility can be met by solutions likewise generated by logical possibility. In the Dr X scenario it is logically possible to describe a situation when the patient's organs have been removed but one minute later Dr P arrives from Planet Q -the location of a hitherto top-secret medical research unit -with a new set of artificial organs that can be inserted into the patient, thus eliminating the grounds for Dr X's ethical dilemma. This is logically possible, just as it is possible that the editor of the JME will pay me £1 million for writing this article. The problem is that there is no good reason for believing that I am about to become a millionaire, just as there is no good reason to expect a reversal of the kind depicted in Cole's scenario. In the real world, logical possibility without the check of plausibility is a worthless guide to action.
Logical fantasies and ordinary concepts
The fears of premature organ removal, outlined in Cole's critique of the weak construal of irreversibility, can be met by appeal to further possibilities. One fantasy is as good as another. Thus organ seeds, manufactured by new unheard of techniques, could be sprinkled on dissected corpses so that lost structures could be restored, thus eliminating at a stroke, all the ethical problems of transplantation and a lot more besides. Yet it is hard to see how this is compatible with the ordinary concept of death. In Cole's world ordinary concepts of death would allow situations where grieving relatives could be told: 'She's only dead for the time being. Come back next week when we might have a reversal'. Despite Cole's appeal to logical possibility, the ordinary concept of death does not admit reversal.
When, in non-medical contexts, death is portrayed as a reversible state, with metaphors suggestive of temporal states, the language used does not convey a belief in possible physical restoration and consequently provides no support for Cole's critique of the medical concept of death. The meaning of the resurrections of Lazarus and Christ, and of the Day of Judgement when the dead shall rise, is a matter of dispute among theologians and philosophers of religion, and it is generally held that they are not accounts to be interpreted in a strong literal sense. These 'reversals' can only support Cole's thesis ifthey are stripped of their religious context and reduced to a simplistic propositional fonn. For example, Christ's resurrection cannot be communicated as an example of a reversal of brainstem death without losing much of its meaning in the Christian faith. A belief in the Day of Judgement is not equivalent to a belief that both cardiorespiratory and brain-related criteria for death are inaccurate. For ceremonial purposes a corpse may be spoken of as a being with moral attributes, but is nevertheless recognised as a corpse. The ancient Chinese left bowls of rice for the departed to take on the journey to the next world, but never really expected the corpse to recover and consume it. Many such elaborate funeral rites include references to the reversal and conquest of death but these indicate the grandeur ofdeath and worth of the life that has passed away, rather than a superstitious prediction of unlimited physical duration. The promise of 'life eternal' is not a rebuke to the doctor who diagnosed death and withdrew therapy.
In their proper context many metaphors of reversibility are meaningful in relation to judgements concerning the quality of the life that has departed. In a ballad about a dead gangster, Joey, Bob Dylan refers to a friend at the funeral saying: 'He ain't dead. He's just asleep' (4) . Given the context of these lines, it would be meaningless to construe them as a prediction of possible reversal; the meaning is to be understood in terms of a judgement concerning the alleged innocence of the life described in the ballad. Only a logician could interpret this as an example of reversal. Likewise, 'At Rest' on a tombstone does not mean that when the whistle blows he will be back at work. The ordinary use of the concept of 'reversible' is far richer than that portrayed by Cole The boundaries of logical possibility are as infinite as the boundaries ofthe imagination, governed only by selfcontradiction. But in the real world appeals to imagination are more restricted than many analytic philosophers believe (6) . In ordinary life, medicine, science and religion, the scope of logical possibility is regulated by mechanisms of plausibility. The Dr X scenario is implausible as there are no satisfactory steps from current thinking and practice to the possibility stipulated.
If doctors are to be guided by ethical rules which take into consideration the possibility that death (not just dying from this or that disease) may be reversed, then a plausible account of the way existing knowledge can be extended in that direction is urgently required. It is not sufficient to appeal to the open-endedness of future medical knowledge or to extrapolate from modern therapeutic procedures which were not available in the past. There is, however, a role for a serious philosophical discussion of reversibility but this must involve an examination of the mechanisms by which theories and technical knowledge can be extended; not an open-ended appeal to logical possibility but through a detailed engagement with medical science and its actual problems.
